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Abstract 
Online forms of harassment, stalking and bullying on social network and communication platforms are now arguably wide-spread and subject to 
regular media coverage. As these provision continue to attract millions of users, generating significant volumes of traffic, regulating abuse and 
effectively reprimanding those who are involved in it, is a difficult and sometimes impossible task. This article collates information acquired from 
22 popular social network and communication platforms in order to identify current regulatory gaps. Terms of service and privacy policies are 
reviewed to assess existing practices of data retention to evaluate the feasibility of law enforcement officials tracking those whose actions 
breach the law. For each provision, account sign-up processes are evaluated and policies for retaining Internet Protocol logs and user account 
information are assessed along with the availability of account preservation orders. Finally, recommendations are offered for improving current 
approaches to regulating social network crime and online offender tracking.  
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1 Introduction 
Online platforms have now revolutionised modern day communication. However, in light of recent global events, social media has now become 
a platform for those to voice both positive and negative sentiment, requiring greater regulation by both the social networking sites themselves 
and the police (Awan, 2016).  With a reported 2.3 billion social network users worldwide (Statista, 2016), the regulation of user behaviour on 
these platforms is a difficult task. In 2015, Vodafone and YouGov surveyed around 5,000 teenagers across 11 countries, where 41% of 
respondents admitted to feeling depressed or helpless from acts of cyberbullying and a further 18% feeling suicidal (Vodafone, 2015). In 
addition, a quarter of those surveyed had actively closed their social media accounts due to acts of cyberbullying (Vodafone, 2015). Similarly, 
the Association of School and College Leaders (2016) reported that 41% of the school leaders surveyed reported an increase in acts of 
students being cyberbullied. In 2016, anti-bullying charity Ditch the Label (2016) surveyed 8,850 persons aged 12-20, with 6 out of 10 of those 
reported to have been bullied, indicating that they had experienced this online. Despite the many benefits offered by online communication and 
social networks, a darker side is also apparent. 
 
Social networks and online forms of communication are frequently identified as problems in the battle against online harassment and abuse. In 
2014, ‘a total of 38 out of 45 police forces saw a rise in the number of crime reports that involved Facebook’ (Birchley, 2015) with ‘the 
Metropolitan Police, receiving 1,207 crime reports which mentioned Facebook, up from 935 in 2013 and 997 in 2012’ (Evans, 2015). Further 
Evans (2015) reports that over ‘16,000 alleged crimes involving Facebook and Twitter were reported’ across all United Kingdom (UK) police 
forces for the period of 2014/15. The Twitter platform is regularly subject to scrutiny due to the volume of trolling (an act of posting 
‘inflammatory or inappropriate messages or comments online for the purpose of upsetting other users and provoking a response’ 
(Dictionary.com, 2016)) which occurs (BBC News, 2016a) and the service has been criticised for failing to be proactive in regulating and 
removing offending content, such as that posted by the extremist cleric Anjem Choudary (BBC News, 2016b). Other examples of social network 
abuse include the 2011 England riots where such provision were used to organise mass congregations and crime, with Williams et al. (2013) 
suggesting that at the time, police were ill-equipped to deal with analysing this content. Yet it remains questionable as to whether some five 
years later, law enforcement are in a better position to tackle these issues.   
 
Reports of sexist and misogynistic comments targetting those on Youtube and Twitch have also received media coverage (BBC News, 2016c), 
yet such incidents form merely a small part of a far greater issue. Frequently high-profile personalities are targeted, where recent examples 
include Stephen Fry, Jennifer Lawrence, Matt Lucas and Sinead O’Connor, prompting their exit from such platforms (Cohen, 2014). In addition, 
attacks upon Sara Payne, the mother of murdered school girl Sarah Payne, and Zelda Williams, the daughter of the now deceased Robin 
Williams show an altogether more sinister side of the harassment which can be suffered online (Cohen, 2014). These instances form only a 
small subset of the overall volume of abuse which is experienced by everyday individuals. Acts of online abuse can now be considered 
relatively common and form part of a greater issue and debate surrounding the need for greater regulation of social networks, a point alluded to 
in the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2016) report into Radicalisation.     
   
Social media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become the recruiting 
platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of millions in revenues generated from billions of people using 
their products needs to be accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact that extremist 
material on their sites is having (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2016, p.34). 
     
Hate crime is also becoming an increasing issue for social network platforms. In the wake of the UK’s vote to leave the European Union 
(commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’), MP Andy Burnham highlighted a subsequent fivefold increase ‘in race hate comments on social media 
channels’ (HC Deb, 2016). This is backed by GLA Conservatives’s (2015) survey which reported 68% of the 308 individuals reviewed had 
encountered hate crime online. The Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC) (2016) states that currently social media is providing 
offenders with a ‘veil of anonymity’ which is prohibiting effective regulation of their conduct, and have recently acquired funding from the Home 
Office Police Innovation Fund (PIF) to develop an online hate crime hub (MOPAC, 2016).  
 
In any of the aforementioned acts, where forms on online content overstep the mark and fall foul of domestic or international legislation, the 
identification on an offender is key to the effective regulation of illegal behaviour. Studies have shown online environments can ‘lower 
behavioral inhibitions’, encouraging disclosures and derogatory actions (Suler, 2004; Lapidot-Lefler and Barak, 2012), yet where an account 
holder cannot be identified there is a lack of accountability for their conduct. This provides an issue for law enforcement when trying to regulate 
and apprehend social network offenders, potentially leaving any victims vulnerable for sustained online abuse. This article examines the terms 
of service, privacy policies and functionality of 22 social network and communication provision in an effort to establish the current feasibility of 
tracking offenders who post content on these platforms in breach of both policy and law. Account sign-up processes are evaluated along with 
policies for the retention of data which could be used to identify those in breach. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are drawn.  
 
2 Regulatory problems 
Guidelines supporting those subject to cyberbullying and online harassment on social networks exist on various organisation portals designed 
to support those subject to these acts. Childline (2016) identify Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Instant messaging (IM), Snapchat, ASKfm and 
Tumblr, and provide guidance for those subject to abuse on these platforms and how to block and report it. The charity ‘Family Lives’ (2016) 
provides guidance on dealing with cyberbullying on Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Whatsapp, Snapchat and Instagram. Other charities offering 
similar advice and resources include The CyberSmile Foundation (2016) and the NSPCC (2016). Policing social media content is notoriously 
difficult and arguably, we are yet to see effective forms of regulation in force across many platforms. The Select Committee on 
Communications’s Report (2014) indicated that this is due to the fact that ‘there is no consistent attitude taken by website operators: some 
require the use of real names (Facebook, although they do not actively confirm users' identities); some allow anonymity but challenge 
impersonation (Twitter) and others allow absolute anonymity’.   
 
The volume of users combined with large quantities of network traffic continue to pose issues (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). Techniques for  
regulating online social network content typically fall within one of two categories, proactive or reactive. Proactive measures address content 
before and as it happens and attempt to prevent its appearance on a given platform in the first instance. Online filters and keyword matching 
are methods for highlighting posts of a particular type and prevent certain forms of language from being submitted (Bekkers et al., 2013). Yet 
the speed of linguistic developments mean that these methods can only serve a limited purpose and may quickly become ineffective as new 
offensive terms or phrases are developed or ways to circumvent their use  are discovered (through the use of punctuation, special symbols to 
break up the plain text meaning of a word). The application of sentiment analysis has also been offered as a way of improving the identification 
of offending messages (Ceron et al., 2014). Social media platforms have also taken steps to encourage users to be proactive about reporting 
incidents online as opposed to waiting for a response from the network itself, introducing the notion of self-policing and user-regulation. 
Facebook have an inbuilt reporting system (Facebook, 2016e) with similar process witnessed on other platforms such as Twitter (2016d) and 
Instagram (2016d). Yet despite such methods, it remains arguable that the complete prevention of abuse is unachievable. Regardless of form, 
where content is posted that reaches it’s intended target (i.e. a victim’s account) in breach of regulations, a reactive response must be formed 
in order to reprimand those responsible.  
 
Where message content breaches platform policies or legislation, it may be deemed necessary to identify and prosecute the individual 
responsible for the post. This is particularly necessary in numerous cases including those of online harassment and threatening behaviour 
where in the UK, the circumstances of the case satisfy the test defined in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). 
The test is twofold where first evidential sufficiency must be achieved (‘a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide 
a realistic prospect of conviction’), before consideration must be given as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest. Before this test can 
be implemented, consideration must be given as to whether there is sufficient evidence available allowing the physical poster of any message 
content to be identified in the first instance. This can be a difficult process, and one where success is subject to the governance and guidelines 
of the platform from which the abusive content took place. In many circumstances, there is insufficient data available to identify account 
holders, hindering effective law enforcement investigation. In absence of the ability to identify an offender, there can often be no legal case to 
proceed with. On many platforms, regulatory issues exist right from the account creation process, where fake information can often be used to 
open an account (Barrett, 2016), providing a starting point for analysis in this article. 
 
2.1 Implementing effective regulatory measures for identifying account holders 
In simple terms, effective regulatory measures on social networks allow for the assessment and evaluation of posted content and the 
enactment of measures to reprimand those who breach both the social media platform terms of use or legal authority. In order to do this, a 
social media platform should be able to hold its users to account for the content they post, where essentially they must be identifiable when 
behavioural breaches occur. To achieve this, social media networks have three current options for account validation, namely direct, indirect 
and metadata validation: 
 
Direct validation: Direct validation requires the user to submit accurately their name and identifying information during the creation 
of their account, and, being able to attribute any posted content to these details. The problem here relates to the term ‘accurate’ 
and the fact that as already highlighted, most social media networks do not accurately validate user input. Typically, social 
network signup procedures require users to input criteria which include name, age and email address. However there is generally 
no processes in place to accurately authenticate this content. Despite so-called ‘real-name’ policies, seen with platforms such as 
Google+ (however, their policy was subsequently rescinded in 2014 (Vincent, 2014)) and Facebook (2016e), name data is not 
authenticated. As a result, account name data cannot be relied upon as a source of offender identifiable information for law 
enforcement in some cases, which has lead to an abundance of unattributable accounts created solely for purposes such as 
trolling. The implementation of an effective name validation process would be onerous and require acts similar to those seen in 
online monetary transactions or where documentary proof of identity can be captured and verified. When considering that many 
of the social network provisions seek to attract users via a no-fuss sign-up process to prevent users from disengaging, it is 
unlikely that these type of verification processes will ever be implemented. Similar concerns surround the use of a valid email 
address (see Section 3.2 for an analysis of sign-up processes). 
 
Indirect Validation: Indirect validation methods may be used to identify an account holder based on their actions and is subject to 
the behaviour of the offender. For example, those users who have their identity validated indirectly include those who post or 
send identifiable message content through disclosure of personal information or media. This can include for example, the posting 
of imagery where an offender is present and can be identified or textual content disclosing identifiable details; these could be 
potentially accidental disclosures. The problem faced here is that those who create accounts solely for the purpose of abuse are 
likely to omit the inclusion of personally identifiable content and therefore the use of indirect validation methods is limited.  
 
Metadata Validation: Metadata validation surrounds the attributing of an account to an individual from the metadata left behind by 
their interaction with the service. The effectiveness of this validation form is often dependant on the service provider and their 
policies regarding the collection and retention of data, and, their willingness to co-operate with law enforcement. Typically 
relevant metadata could include: 
 
1. Internet Protocol (IP) Address: IP information can (not always, subject to spoofing) be used to identify an internet 
connection from which offending communications were made, and potentially their location.  
2. Device information: This includes information such as the user's device type and telephone number if they are 
accessing services via a mobile device. 
3. Geolocational data relating to the poster of content.  
 
The above information can be classed as ‘log data’ and is subject to the following limitations. 
 
1. Log retention: In regards to metadata account validation, the retention of logged data poses a number of issues. 
The first issue comes from the assumption that relevant data is stored in the first instance. In cases where no 
appropriate logs are retained, account identification via metadata is not feasible, creating a significant issue, as 
account usage metadata is arguably the most likely source of data which is of use to law enforcement. Even when log 
data is retained, the length of time is critical, where sufficient time must be provided to ensure the necessary legal 
authority is sought in order to obtain the data. Given that many platforms witness significant volumes of traffic, a factor 
impacting the length of time data is retained is often the cost of having to store the data in the first place. It is not 
feasible for many organisations to suffer the cost of retaining all traffic indefinitely, but in some instances, where data 
is only kept for a matter of weeks, it may not be enough time for an effective response. Therefore log retention times 
can hinder investigation attempts. 
 
2. Type of log data collected: The type of data collected is also key to an effective investigation. Service providers 
may omit to collect the necessary metadata to validate an account.   
 
3. Account and data deletion: The removal of posted content can pose an issue, for example where an individual 
posts a message and then intentionally deletes it. If the victim has not made a record of the offending messages then 
law enforcement remain reliant on the service provider to have retained a copy of this content. The problem here is 
two-fold, where issues come from those who delete individual offending content, and/or, decide to delete the 
offending account. As with the problem of log retention noted above, storage space becomes an issue. Given the 
volume of traffic, it is unlikely that inactive content (i.e. deleted) will be retained for any substantial period of time or 
potentially at all. Therefore if the user choses to a) delete content and/or b) delete the offending account. Law 
enforcement are reliant on the service providers maintenance of retrievable content. In some cases, this may not be 
available.  
 
3 Taking a look at existing platforms 
This article has highlighted 22 social network, online communication and blogging websites in order to analyse their current account signup 
processes, terms and conditions and privacy policies in an attempt to assess the feasibility of tracking the physical users of offending accounts. 
These provision were chosen based on their popularity and having been highlighted as potentially problematic platforms by charities like the 
NSPCC (2016) and Childline (2016). 
 
The services analysed are:- 
 
Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Instagram, Snapchat, Youtube, Reddit, ASKfm, Tumblr, Vine, Bebo, Quora, Flickr, Hi5, Pinterest, Buzzfeed, 
Badoo, Scribd, Wordpress, Foursquare, Vimeo and LinkedIn.  
 
3.1 Age of use  
As with most online services, the terms and conditions associated to each platform define the age a person must be before they can legally 
sign up for the service. From the 22 services, 16 define this age as 13 years and above. Badoo, Hi5 and Buzzfeed identify this age as 18. 
LinkedIn specify age requirements specific to country of origin (13 years old for all countries except People's Republic of China, Netherlands, 
United States, Canada, Germany, Spain, Australia and South Korea). Finally Youtube and Vine state that users must be old enough to form a 
binding legal contract. Despite defining an age, similar to the issues with validating name information on account sign-up, there are no age 
validation procedures when a user creates their account (although many services (see Myspace (2016d) for example) will delete your account if 
they suspect you are not of an appropriate age) and therefore this information cannot be relied upon to support tying a physical individual to an 
account. This lack of validation is also potentially placing some population demographics at risk, particularly children. Nominet’s (2014) survey 
into child social media usage states that by ‘age 10, over half (59%) of children have used a social network’ in breach of platform terms and 
conditions. As a result, ‘21% of those surveyed stated they had posted negative comments by the average age of 11 and 43% had messaged 
strangers by an average age of 12’ (Nominet, 2014). Such concerns are exacerbated when it is considered that any form of inappropriate 
content targeted at a child may not be attributable to a physical offender, through a lack of traceability on these platforms.  
 
3.2 Sign-up process 
The account sign-up process for the 22 services highlighted in this article provides the first source of potentially useful information for tracking 
down an individual attributed to an offending account. When analysing the signup process it was found that all 22 services requested at least 
the name of the individual (full or first and last names), with no means of validating the accuracy of inputted content. All 22 services offered 
signup via an email address, with Twitter and Facebook offering a dual sign-up process of either email or mobile telephone number (verified via 
SMS message). Of the 22 services, only LinkedIn prevented users from using the service (successfully logging on) without first validating the 
email address used to signup for an account via sending a registration confirmation email to that account. As a result, the other 21 services 
could be accessed by supplying fake name details and a fake email address, providing that it was entered in the format of a legitimate email 
account provider. For tests within this article, a fake randomly generated email prefix string was added to ‘@gmail.com’ and successfully used 
to sign in. Although this may seem trivial, in reality it causes greater difficulty for law enforcement attempting to track individuals. Not only does 
it encourage the creation of trolling accounts as it can take seconds to generate an account on these platforms without the need to first create a 
valid email address, but it also lessens the chance of the user inputting identifiable content in the signup process. For example, where a valid, 
accessible email account is needed in order to activate an account on sign-up for any of the above social network services, in some cases an 
individual may opt to use their personal email address without contemplating the potential to be identified later, which may have been set up for 
legitimate purposes with accurate details (see Figure 1 for an example of how the use of an email service provider may also provide traceable 
information). At which point, a service provider may store a record the email address used at signup and attribute it to the offending account 
and therefore law enforcement may be able to contact to the email service provider for additional content.  
 
Figure 1. An overview of the signup process 
 
Yet the problem faced by social networks and the lack of validation of account sign-up details also exists with email service providers. This 
article also analysed the signup process at both Outlook and Google Mail in order to acquire an email address, arguably two of the most 
popular email service providers. Outlook requested that on sign-up, users provide a secondary backup email address and verification mobile 
number in addition to name, location and age data. The benefit here is that where a user must provide a mobile number to verify, providing a 
record of the number is kept, network service provider records may be queried in order to potentially identify the actual user of the account 
(subject to spoofing and pay-as-you-go numbers). Outlook requires this data before allowing the account to be created, however it accepted a 
number of ‘55555555555’ and a randomly generated email address, with the suffix ‘@gmail.com’. The problem this presents is that even 
though there is a requirement for what appears to be extra validation, it also cannot be relied upon. Similar processes were witnessed on the 
Google Mail platform.  
 
3.3 Terms, conditions and privacy 
Given the issues present on sign-up for the 22 services, offending tracking may be reliant on what was previously coined as metadata account 
validation in Section 2.1. To assess the feasibility of law enforcement achieving this, Table 1 presents a breakdown of the key inclusions in the 
terms of service and privacy policies of all 22 platforms, with a focus on IP log retention and account content and deletion procedures. 
 
Service Is IP info 
stored? 
How long is it 
retained? 
Key policy points of interest 
Facebook Yes Does not say. IP related information:- “When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying the 
recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in backup 
copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be available to others)” (Facebook, 2016a).  
 
Information around data deletion:- “Information associated with accounts will be kept until an account 
is deleted, unless we no longer need the data to provide products and services” (Facebook, 2016b). 
Accounts can be deactivated, essentially placing it in a suspended state. They can be reactivated at 
any time.  
 
When an account is deleted, the following are key points of interest taken from Facebook’s account 
deletion information (Facebook, 2016c):-  
● Deletion is delayed for a few days after it's requested. If you log in during this time, deletion is 
canceled. 
● Access can’t be regained once the account is deleted. 
● It may take up to 90 days to delete data stored in backup systems. Your info isn't accessible 
on Facebook during this time. 
● Data related to an account may not be deleted. For example, a friend may have messages 
from you after the account is deleted. 
● Copies of some material (ex: log records) may remain in Facebook databases but are 
disassociated from personal identifiers. 
 
Additional retained device information:- “Attributes such as the operating system, hardware version, 
device settings, file and software names and types, battery and signal strength, and device identifiers. 
Device locations, including specific geographic locations, such as through GPS, Bluetooth, or WiFi 
signals. Connection information such as the name of your mobile operator or ISP, browser type, 
language and timezone, mobile phone number and IP address” (Facebook, 2016b).  
 
Users can self-disclosure account information and download their Facebook profile data (Facebook, 
2016g). 
Twitter Yes Does not say.  IP related information:- “Given Twitter's real-time nature, some information (e.g., IP logs) may only be 
stored for a very brief period of time” (Twitter, 2016b). The privacy policy (Twitter, 2016c) suggests IP 
data may be available for up to 18 months. 
 
Information around data deletion:- Users can deactivate their account. A user then has 30 days to 
reinstate the account before permanent deletion. “After deactivation, your account should be removed 
within a few minutes, however some content may be viewable on twitter.com for a few days.” (Twitter, 
2016a). If the account is not reinstated after 30 days, Twitter will begin the process of deleting the 
account, which can take up to 1 week (Twitter, 2016a). Some content may be indexed by search 
engines beyond Twitter's control.  
 
Twitter’s ‘default is almost always to make the information you provide through the Twitter Services 
public for as long as you do not delete it’ (Twitter, 2016c). ‘Content deleted by account holders (e.g., 
Tweets) is generally not available’ (Twitter, 2016b). 
Instagram Yes Does not say. IP related information:- Given the volume of real-time content on Instagram, some information may 
only be stored for a short period of time (Instagram, 2016a). 
 
Information around data deletion:- Users have both the option to permanently delete and suspend 
their account option (Instagram, 2016b). There is no indication on how data is tret when an account 
holder deletes individual content (photos etc). Instagram's privacy policy (2016c) discloses account 
sign up details, analytics, log and device identifier content are retained but the length of time is not 
stated. 
Myspace Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per the Myspace Privacy Policy - “even after you cancel your 
Account or delete information or Profile Content, copies of some information from your Account or 
Profile(s) may remain viewable in circumstances where, for example, you have posted information on 
another User's Profile, shared information with a Third-Party Linked Service, or if another Visitor or 
Member copied, stored or shared your information or has a copy of the link to content you shared on 
the Myspace Services. To the extent permitted by applicable law, we may also retain backup 
information related to your Account and associated Profile(s) on our servers for as long as is 
reasonably necessary after cancellation for fraud detection, site operation or to comply with applicable 
law or our internal security policies. Please be aware that, due to the nature of certain internet and 
mobile technologies outside of our control, such as caching and networked technology, your Account 
may not be instantly inaccessible to others, and there may be a delay in the removal of your 
information and content from elsewhere on the internet and from search engines.” (Myspace, 2016a) 
Foursquare Yes Does not say. Information around data deletion:- As per Foursquare’s privacy policy - “Because of the way we 
maintain Foursquare, such deletion may not be immediate, and residual copies of your profile 
information or posts may remain on backup media for up to ninety (90) days. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, we will retain information as required by applicable law and we will not delete any 
information that has already been aggregated or anonymized…. Even after you remove information 
from your account or profile, copies of that information may remain viewable elsewhere, to the extent 
it has been shared with others, it was otherwise distributed pursuant to your privacy settings, or it was 
copied or stored by other users. Removed and deleted information may remain on backup media for 
up to ninety (90) days prior to being deleted from our servers” (Foursquare, 2016a). 
 
Device and account usage information (operating system, browser information etc.) captured. 
Snapchat Yes Does not say Information around data deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy policy - “On our end, that means that we 
automatically delete the content of your Snaps (the photo and video messages that you send your 
friends) from our servers after we detect that a Snap has been opened by all recipients or has 
expired” (Snapchat, 2016a). In addition, the policy also acknowledges the possibility of data recovery 
from the local device - “It’s also possible, as with any digital information, that someone might be able 
to access messages forensically or find them in a device’s temporary storage” (Snapchat, 2016a). 
 
The period of time information exists before deletion depends on the type of message you post on 
Snapchat:- 
● Snaps: Automatically deleted after they’ve been viewed by all recipients. Opened Snaps 
typically cannot be retrieved from Snapchat's servers by anyone, for any reason. Snapchat 
servers are designed to automatically delete unopened Snaps after 30 days. 
● Chat messages: Automatically deleted after sender and recipient have seen it and swiped out 
of the Chat screen – unless either party presses and holds to save it. 
● My Story: Automatically deleted 24 hours after each Snap is posted. 
● Live Stories: Live Story or Local Story Snaps may be archived (no indication of time) 
(Snapchat, 2016c). 
 
Information around account deletion:- As per Snapchat’s privacy policy - “If you ask to delete your 
account, you will have up to 30 days to restore your account before we delete your information from 
our servers. During this period of time, your account will not be visible to other Snapchatters.” 
(Snapchat, 2016a). 
Youtube Yes Does not say Myactivity.google.com and https://takeout.google.com provide a means for analysing historics activity 
on the Youtube platfomr (subject to the account user changing proviacy settings). Although retention 
periods are not disclosed, the following example of content typically disclosed to law enforcement with 
suitable authority is provided.  
 
‘Subpoena: 
● Subscriber registration information 
● Sign-in IP addresses and associated time stamps 
Court Order: 
● Video upload IP address and associated time stamp 
● Information obtainable with a subpoena 
Search Warrant: 
● Copy of a private video and associated video information 
● Private message content 
● Information obtainable with a subpoena or court order’ (Google, 2016) 
Reddit Yes Potentially 100 days 
(Reddit, 2016a) 
IP related information:- As per the privacy policy - “Except for the IP address used to create your 
account, Reddit will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 days” (Reddit, 2016a). 
 
Information around account deletion:- “When you delete your account, your profile is no longer visible 
to other users and disassociated from content you posted under that account. Please note, however, 
that the posts, comments, and messages you submitted prior to deleting your account will still be 
visible to others, unless you delete such content” (Reddit, 2016a).  
ASKfm Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Where an account is deactivated, the user “should ordinarily be 
able to restore the account and the whole of the profile within 12 months of deactivating it but we 
cannot guarantee that this will always be the case” (ASKfm, 2016a).  
 
In regards to closing an account, “once processed, profile data will be removed from the Services and 
any questions to friends will be converted to anonymous questions (in other words, questions asked 
will remain visible but will appear to be from an anonymous user). A user will be able to reactivate 
their account by logging back in for a period of 30 days after your request to leave ASKfm is 
processed. At the end of that period the account will be deleted and all “likes” which you have added 
to questions will be removed. We will delete the data as soon as reasonably practicable, but in certain 
cases limited types of data, including log files and backups, may take up to 90 days to be fully 
deleted” (ASKfm, 2016a). 
Tumblr Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:-  “Deleting an Account may not fully remove the content you 
have published from our systems, as caching of, backups of, copies of, or references to your Account 
Information may not be immediately removed. In addition, given the nature of sharing on the Services, 
some of the public activity on your Account prior to deletion (such as reblogs of your blog posts) may 
remain stored on our servers and accessible to the public”. (Tumblr, 2016a). 
Vine Yes Potentially up to 18 
months  
IP related information:- “If not already done earlier, we will either delete Log Data or remove any 
common account identifiers, such as your username, full IP address, or email address, after 18 
months” (Vine, 2016a). 
 
Information around account deletion:- “Disconnecting your Vine account will immediately revoke our 
authorization to cross-post on your behalf or otherwise access that account and we will delete 
information obtained from that connection (other than information that was publicly posted on Vine, 
such as profile information), which may take some time” (Vine, 2016a). 
Badoo Yes Does not say  Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivated and restored within a 30 day 
period. If not restored in this time, an account will be permanently deleted within 14 days from the 
expiration of the deactivation period. “Information (such as contact history) is deleted by us over a 
longer timescale, by way of housekeeping on a periodic basis. Removed and deleted information may 
persist in backup copies for up to 30 days to enable restoration, but will not be available to others in 
the meantime” (Badoo, 2016a). 
Scribd Yes Does not say No information available.  
Wordpress Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “If you delete content, Automattic will use reasonable efforts to 
remove it from WordPress.com, but you acknowledge that caching or references to the Content may 
not be made immediately unavailable” (Wordpress, 2016a). 
Buzzfeed Yes Does not say Information around content deletion:- “All content submitted by you to the Services may be retained 
by us indefinitely, even after you terminate your account” (Buzzfeed, 2016a). 
Quora Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- Accounts can be deactivated (placed in a suspended state). 
“Deleting your Quora account means that the following content will be removed from public view: your 
profile including photos and bio, your answers, comments, blog posts, votes, endorsements, and 
messages. Questions you may have asked will remain, since questions on Quora are community 
owned, but will not be associated with your name publicly” (Quora, 2016a) 
 
“Once you confirm, your account will be deactivated immediately and the deletion process will begin. 
After this point, you’ll have 14 days to change your mind and reactivate your account by logging in. 
Once the 14 day grace period has expired and your account has been deleted, your content and 
profile will no longer be publicly accessible. Older versions of your content or account may be stored 
indefinitely by Quora in the form of backups or internal logs” (Quora, 2016a). 
Flickr Yes Does not say Flickr is a product of Yahoo and therefore information is acquired from Yahoo’s privacy policy (Yahoo, 
2016a). Following Yahoo’s Data Storage and Anonymisation policy (Yahoo, 2016b),  
 
● “Yahoo’s anonymisation policy applies only to search log data. 
● Yahoo stores this data in an identifiable form for up to 18 months. 
● IP addresses within search user log data will be anonymised or deleted within 6 months from 
the time of collection.” 
 
Limited information is available regarding how deleted data/accounts are handled. 
Pinterest Yes  Does not say. Information around account deletion:- “Following termination or deactivation of your account, or if you 
remove any User Content from Pinterest, we may retain your User Content for a commercially 
reasonable period of time for backup, archival, or audit purposes. Furthermore, Pinterest and its users 
may retain and continue to use, store, display, reproduce, re-pin, modify, create derivative works, 
perform, and distribute any of your User Content that other users have stored or shared through 
Pinterest” (Pinterest, 2016a) 
Hi5 Yes Indefinitely “All personal information collected by hi5 in connection with your use of the Site and described in this 
Privacy Policy, including without limitation your name, location, email address, photos and videos, 
friend connections, messages, comments, login information, IP address and other data, will be stored 
by hi5 indefinitely” (Hi5, 2016a). 
Vimeo Yes Does not say Information around account deletion:- “You may delete your account at any time. Basic accounts may 
be deleted from the Vimeo Service if they remain inactive (i.e., the user fails to log in) for a continuous 
period of at least six (6) months. Subscription accounts will remain active until the end of the 
subscription term and any renewal term” (Vimeo, 2016a). 
LinkedIn Yes Potentially 7 days 
after account 
deletion, at which 
point logs are 
depersonalized  
(LinkedIn 2016a). 
IP related information:- Potentially 7 days after account deletion, at which point logs are 
depersonalized  (LinkedIn 2016a). However, LinkedIn’s law enforcement guidelines (2016b) suggests 
there is a 24 month limit on IP information from law enforcement data requests in unusual cases. 
 
Information around account deletion:- “We retain the personal information you provide while your 
account is in existence or as needed to provide you services. We may retain your personal 
information even after you have closed your account if retention is reasonably necessary to comply 
with our legal obligations, meet regulatory requirements, resolve disputes between Members, prevent 
fraud and abuse, or enforce this Privacy Policy and our User Agreement. 
 
If you close your account(s), your information will generally be removed from the Service within 24 
hours. We generally delete closed account information and will de-personalize any logs or other 
backup information through the deletion process within 30 days of account closure. We de-
personalize within 7 days (although we do maintain 30 days worth of web server logs for security, 
debugging, and site stability purposes only) by creating aggregate data sets that cannot be traced 
back to individuals” (LinkedIn 2016a). 
Bebo Unknown.  Nothing is stated in 
the Privacy Policy 
Information around content deletion:- “If you or we remove your User Content, BEBO might retain 
your User Content for a commercially reasonable period of time for backup, archival, or audit 
regarding IP address 
content (Bebo, 
2016a). 
purposes. Furthermore, BEBO and other Users might retain and continue to display, reproduce, 
transmit, modify, re-arrange, and distribute any of your User Content that other Users have 
transmitted on the App” (Bebo, 2016b). 
 
4 Discussion of regulations 
As can be seen within Table 1, the stance taken by social media platforms in regards to data deletion and retained information varies. To 
analyse this content, discussions are broken down into two areas, data deletion and IP information.  
 
4.1 The problem with deleting content 
Content on these platforms is volatile and often vulnerable to the original poster’s intentions to delete or keep any posted messages. As a 
result, police guidelines indicate that an individual should attempt to make record of any offending content  as soon as it is identified as it may 
be the only chance to capture a record of it (ACPO, 2012; Hampshire Police, n.d.; Westyorkshire Police, n.d.). The problem remains that even 
where content is identified or recorded by a victim, it could be removed at any point from the service in question, potentially before relevant 
metadata can be preserved for identification purposes. There is no consistent approach to deleted data in the 22 platforms analysed, and 
although guidance is provided around deleting an account, there is little guidance as to how deleted account content is handled or archived by 
service infrastructure. In relation to deleted account content, where an offender chooses to delete their actual account time is crucial to 
ensuring potential evidential data is retained. The problem here is that law enforcement must obtain the relevant legal authority to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the social network services before data can be disclosed and this process can be slow. This is compounded by the 
fact that there is no actual defined consistent period of retention from which law enforcement authorities can make an informed judgement as to 
the feasibility of requesting data from these services. This ambiguity within policies can cost both time and money, leading to unsatisfactory 
case outcomes, and provides an area in need of improvement and clarity. 
 
From the 22 platforms examined in this article, the following platforms provide guidance targeted at law enforcement:- Facebook (2016d), 
Pinterest (2016b), Twitter (2016b), Snapchat (2016b), Myspace (2016b), Tumblr (2016b), Instagram (2016a), ASKfm (2016b), Badoo (2016a), 
Youtube (Google, 2016), Reddit (2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Flickr (Yahoo, 2016b), Foursquare (2016b) and Wordpress (2016). These 
guidelines aim to explain the processes involved in submitting a request for information. One of the key processes for supporting law 
enforcement when interacting with social network platforms is the preservation order, allowing potentially evidential account data to be stored 
(not disclosed), pending relevant legal authority. Here, requests can be made to preserve data in connection with an offence, providing the 
correct legal authority is obtained for future disclosure, where generally a 90 period of preservation is set (Brunty and Helenek, 2014). For 
example, Facebook will preserve account data for 90 once relevant legal requests have been made (Facebook, 2016d). A 90 day preservation 
period is also obtainable from Twitter (2016b), Tumblr (2016b), ASKfm (2016b), Reddit (2016b), Instagram (2016a), Foursquare (2016b), Flickr 
(Yahoo, 2016b), LinkedIn (2016b), Snapchat (2016b) (one additional 90-day period of extension can be requested in addition, making a total of 
180). Myspace (2016c) preserve account data for 180 days. Wordpress (2016b) preserve data for 45 days and Pinterest’s (2016b) law 
enforcement guidance does not define a period of preservation.  
 
Often, the preservation order must specify the boundaries of the request in terms of time and amount of information from a specific account 
(Sammons, 2015). A blanket request for information may not be suitable, placing emphasis on suitable recognisance around an event to 
ensure that evidential information is contained within the requested period. It must also be noted that many social networks inform the account 
holder subject to a preservation order once it has been submitted (Sammons, 2015). 
 
 
Many current investigations involve Social Networking Sites. It is imperative that early consideration is made around securing Social 
Networking Profiles that fall within the investigation. The best evidence is available from the service provider however they are often located 
outside of the UK and may or may not secure the content on the appropriate request via the force CSP/ISP SPOC. As such the investigator 
should always secure a copy of what is seen by them as this may be the only opportunity to secure this evidence before it changes.  ACPO!!!!- 
link in 
 
4.2 IP logs 
As highlighted previously, IP log information can be a key source of information for identifying offenders. However, none of the 22 platforms 
clearly define their log retention period. For example, Reddit states that ‘will delete any IP addresses collected after 100 days’ (Reddit, 2016a) 
but does not indicate what IP information it retains and whether it stores it for at least 100 days before deletion, with Hi5 stating this information 
is kept indefinitely (Hi5, 2016a) and Bebo does not comment on the issue. From Table 1, it can be seen that a common stance is to indicate 
that IP logs are collected but to omit to determine a time frame. As with ambiguity surrounding account and content deletion policies, the lack of 
a determined and consistent stance on retention can be detrimental to law enforcement's ability to mount an effective investigation and in some 
circumstances may also deter an attempt in belief that the relevant information does not exist.     
 
4.2.1 Request method and extracted data formats 
Request methods and extracted data format Establishing levels of access and engagement with social media platforms by law enforcement is 
difficult. The procedures associated with making a request for data vary depending on the social media platform, with limited information 
available. Facebook operate a ‘Law Enforcement Online Request System’ accessible and authenticated through the use of a valid law 
enforcement email address (also used for their associated product Instagram (2017)) (Facebook, 2017). Instagram highlight that those who do 
not submit via the law enforcement portal (opting for mail or email), then longer response rates may be witnessed (Instagram (2016a)). This 
process should be compared with services such as Myspace who simply offer contact methods of fax, mail or email, directed towards an 
appropriate legal department (Myspace (2016c)). In addition, there is limited information available within available policy information on the 
platforms analysed to indicate expected request response times. Establishing the format which law enforcement will receive any retained data 
is also difficult to ascertain due to limited disclosure of information in policy information. Twitter (2016b) indicate that content will be provided in 
electronic format which can be opened using generic word processing software. Further, Google's ‘Takeout’ function allows standard users to 
download an archive of their data containing information relating to Google's various products, where the format of data varies depending on 
content (for example, contacts are provided in vCard form, Google Drive documents provided in Microsoft Office associated formats). Although 
not stated, a similar standard for extracted data may be adopted for law enforcement, but this would need to be established on a case by case 
basis. 
 
4.3 Location and cooperation 
Location has an impact on communication and cooperation with the provision in question. Of the 22 platforms analysed, 20 are based in the 
United States (US) and are governed by US law, with ASKfm is based in Dublin and Badoo in UK. Therefore those operating outside of these 
locations must seek cross-jurisdictional compliance with these organisations which may not in all circumstances be straightforward, and costly 
in terms of time and money. This can sometimes be achieved through Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA), which ‘is a method of cooperation 
between states for obtaining assistance in the investigation or prosecution of criminal offences. MLA is generally used for obtaining material 
that cannot be obtained on a police cooperation basis, particularly enquiries that require coercive means’ (Gov.uk, 2016). However, cooperation 
with social network provision is not guaranteed, a problem which has become a somewhat controversial matter of discussion in recent years, 
centering around arguments of freedom of speech, privacy and alleged government spying regimes. For example, The Select Committee on 
Communications (2014) indicated that recently, French authorities had to endure a lengthy court battle with Twitter for the disclosure of account 
details for those posting of anti-Semitic tweets. Twitter’s (2016e) Transparency Report surrounding received information requests, indicates that 
compliance can vary. The United Kingdom (UK), Japan and US form the 3 current biggest requesters of data from Twitter. From statistics 
reported from January to June 2016, information was supplied by Twitter in 82% of requests from the US, 61% from Japan and 76% from the 
UK. When taken in context, 453 requests for information from the US were unsuccessful, 282 from Japan and 151 from the UK. In comparison, 
Facebook’s (2016h) Government Request Report shows the US, India and UK to be the biggest requesters. From statistics reported from July 
to December 2015, information was supplied by Facebook in 81% of requests from the US, 51% from India and 82% from UK. When taken in 
context, 3654 requests for information from the US were unsuccessful, 2724 from India and 754 from the UK. In these circumstances, 
potentially evidential information may have been withheld, potentially prohibiting an investigation.      
 
4.4 Recent developments in the United Kingdom: Investigatory Powers Act 2016  
With a focus on developments within the United Kingdom, the recent enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and its potential impact 
on social media investigations must be 8 G. Horsman / Digital Investigation xxx (2017) 1e11 Please cite this article in press as: Horsman, G., A 
survey of current social network and online communication provision policies to support law enforcement identify offenders, Digital Investigation 
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2017.03.001 considered. Often termed the ‘Snoopers Charter’, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
(IPA16) received royal assent on the 29th November 2016. Despite receiving criticism for implementing various powers considered by some as 
being for the purposes of mass surveillance through bulk data retention, the IPA16 came into force on December 30th 2016 and its many 
powers include the facilitation of the preservation of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) for 12 months by telecommunications service. ICRs 
are defined under section 62(7) IPA16 as records of the visits made to online services and websites by a user, used to examine where a user 
has been online. This is elaborated by the Home Office's (2016a, p17) Communications Data Draft Code of Practice stating ‘an ICR will only 
identify the service that a customer has been using. It is not intended to show what a customer has been doing on that service’. Yet, the bulk 
maintenance of ICRs by Internet Service Providers may only provide limited assistance in social media investigations (by potentially 
determining if a user has accessed a particular platform) due to the fundamental limitations imposed by an ICR, particularly in relation to the 
user of mobile device social media applications. This was reported by Adrian Kennard (2015), Managing Director Internet Service Provider 
Andrews & Arnold Ltd to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill who stated that even ‘if the mobile provider was even able 
to tell that she had used twitter at all (which is not as easy as it sounds), it would show that the phone had been connected to twitter 24 h a day, 
and probably Facebook as well. This is because the very nature of messaging and social media applications is that they stay connected so that 
they can quickly alert you to messages, calls, or amusing cat videos, without any delay’. Despite this being an issue with retained service 
provider information, the IPA16s deliberately wide definition of ‘telecommunications service’ still may provide some assistance to law 
enforcement. The Home Office's (2016b, p6) Interception of Communications Draft Code of Practice indicates that ‘Internet based services 
such as web-based email, messaging applications and cloud-based services are, therefore, covered by this definition’, where Smith (2016) 
indicates that social media services would be incorporated. In addition, the powers of the IPA16 extend to ‘an operator outside the UK who 
provides a telecommunications service to people in the UK, or controls a telecommunication system in the UK’ (Smith, 2016). Providers are 
under an obligation to take reasonable practicable steps to give effect to any served warrant (see section 43 IPA16), regardless of their 
geographical location (Stringer, 2017). Therefore powers under the IPA16 are potentially enforceable via injunction against foreign social media 
providers (noted previously in Section “Location and cooperation” in relation to geographical location of many providers) subject to potential 
conflict with any foreign jurisdictional conflict (Smith, 2016). In such instances, social media providers may be required not only to maintain 
information regarding accesses to their platforms, but in turn, disclose this information subject to the correct legal processes being followed. 
 
5 Concluding thoughts 
As shown above, there are two main areas which currently pose an issue in the regulation of social network crime, account validation and 
retention policies. First, account validation remains a clear issue and is unlikely to be addressed soon. Validated accounts would not only allow 
effective identification but also act as a deterrent to individuals as the perceived anonymity offered by the Internet is partially combatted. Yet as 
already highlighted, the processes needed to achieve this are unlikely to be favourably adopted by social network services. Second, data 
retention also remains an issue, and one which is likely going to get worse, largely due to the significant volumes of traffic witnessed across 
these platforms. At present, the task of retaining data is onerous and in absence of legal regulations forcing retention, the task of doing so is 
simply voluntary. Retaining all data indefinitely is not feasible and not necessarily needed, and to some extend, retention is already occurring. 
However, to improve current processes, clarity, transparency and consistency of retention processes is needed, an issue shown in Table 1. It is 
proposed that the global adoption of a single standard for retaining data in terms of length of time and type is required for all social network 
services, yet the feasibility of achieving this without legal regulation is debatable.  
 
Ideally, IP logs should be maintained for long enough for this information to support investigatory processes, yet arbitrarily defining a period of 
time is not effective. Instead, collaboration between platforms must take place with law enforcement organisations to ensure that the data is 
retained for long enough to cover the period from first reporting of a crime by a victim up until legal processes are suitably activated to secure 
the disclosure of information. Preservation orders (as discussed above) provide some support but it is necessary to scrutinise further whether 
the commonly define period of 90 days is long enough to meet the required standard for disclosure of information from the service in question. 
Transparency in data retention times may also serve as a deterrent to those utilising the platforms. Where clear guidance is given regarding 
how long user actions are maintained, there may be a greater chance of potential offenders not breaching regulations in fear of detection. 
Achieving satisfactory retention of data must be balanced against the right for privacy and freedom of speak, a debate which is likely to 
continue for some time. 
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